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Abstract
Background: Ubiquitous health is defined as a dynamic network of interconnected systems that offers health services independent
of time and location to a data subject (DS). The network takes place in open and unsecure information space. It is created and
managed by the DS who sets rules that regulate the way personal health information is collected and used. Compared to health
care, it is impossible in ubiquitous health to assume the existence of a priori trust between the DS and service providers and to
produce privacy using static security services. In ubiquitous health features, business goals and regulations systems followed
often remain unknown. Furthermore, health care-specific regulations do not rule the ways health data is processed and shared.
To be successful, ubiquitous health requires novel privacy architecture.
Objective: The goal of this study was to develop a privacy management architecture that helps the DS to create and dynamically
manage the network and to maintain information privacy. The architecture should enable the DS to dynamically define service
and system-specific rules that regulate the way subject data is processed. The architecture should provide to the DS reliable trust
information about systems and assist in the formulation of privacy policies. Furthermore, the architecture should give feedback
upon how systems follow the policies of DS and offer protection against privacy and trust threats existing in ubiquitous
environments.
Methods: A sequential method that combines methodologies used in system theory, systems engineering, requirement analysis,
and system design was used in the study. In the first phase, principles, trust and privacy models, and viewpoints were selected.
Thereafter, functional requirements and services were developed on the basis of a careful analysis of existing research published
in journals and conference proceedings. Based on principles, models, and requirements, architectural components and their
interconnections were developed using system analysis.
Results: The architecture mimics the way humans use trust information in decision making, and enables the DS to design
system-specific privacy policies using computational trust information that is based on systems’ measured features. The trust
attributes that were developed describe the level systems for support awareness and transparency, and how they follow general
and domain-specific regulations and laws. The monitoring component of the architecture offers dynamic feedback concerning
how the system enforces the polices of DS.
Conclusions: The privacy management architecture developed in this study enables the DS to dynamically manage information
privacy in ubiquitous health and to define individual policies for all systems considering their trust value and corresponding
attributes. The DS can also set policies for secondary use and reuse of health information. The architecture offers protection
against privacy threats existing in ubiquitous environments. Although the architecture is targeted to ubiquitous health, it can easily
be modified to other ubiquitous applications.
(JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2013;1(2):e23)   doi:10.2196/mhealth.2731
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Introduction
Overview
Both ubiquitous health and pervasive health are terms that
describe a new business model (these terms have been used in
many papers synonymously). Similarly to health care, its goal
is to make health services available to everyone, but many of
its features separate it from health care [1]. According to
Ruotsalainen et al, ubiquitous health is a metasystem that is a
dynamic network of interconnected systems offering health
services to a data subject (DS) in an unsecure information space
[1]. Contrary to health care where the services are defined by
health professionals, in ubiquitous health, the DS creates the
network, selects the systems, and sets rules (policies) that
regulate how and by whom the DS’ health information is used
and shared. In ubiquitous health, the existence of predefined
trust between the DS and systems cannot be assumed, and
systems’ features, their business goals, and regulation systems
followed are often unknown. Furthermore, health care-specific
regulations do not rule the ways health data is processed and
shared [1]. It is evident that ubiquitous health features generate
privacy and trustworthiness challenges that should be solved to
make it successful.
Privacy is a complex, personal, and situation-depending concept
that can be interpreted in various ways [2]. Westin defined
privacy as “the claim of an individual to determine what
information about himself or herself should be known to others
and what uses will be made of it by others” [3]. Privacy is also
a human right that is protected by international directives and
constitutions. Privacy protection approaches aim at hiding user’s
identity and/or some part of the personal identifiable information
(PII), whereas privacy management offers transparency to the
DS concerning the collection and processing of PII.
Trust can be understood as the subjectively perceived probability
by a DS that a system will perform an action before the DS can
monitor it [4]. It indicates uncertainty about the features of
communication partners [5,6]. Trust is also context-dependent
and the ways it is formulated vary, for example, it can be based
on the recommendation received from others, it can be
reputation-based, or it may be a subjective degree of belief of
others [7,8].
Privacy and trust are interrelated concepts, that is, “data
disclosure means loss of privacy, but an increased level of
trustworthiness reduces the need for privacy” [1]. The DS
interest is to get maximum benefit from services and at the same
time to minimize the loss of privacy.
In health care, internationally accepted principles, good practice
rules, and domain-specific legislation define patient’s rights
and service providers’ responsibilities. Health care-specific
legislation also states how patient’s privacy must be protected
[1]. Researchers have started to develop such kind of principles
for ubiquitous health. Ruotsalainen et al have developed the
THEWS (Trusted eHealth and eWelfare Space) principles for
trustworthy ubiquitous health. The THEWS principles state that
the DS possesses the right [1]: to verify the trustworthiness any
system that collects or processes his or her personal health
information (PHI). Principles state that DS should also have the
right for controlling the processing of PHI, both inside the
systems and between them. DS should define personal privacy
policies, which regulate how his or her health data is collected,
processed, disclosed, shared, stored, or destroyed. The principles
also require the DS to be aware of all events, situations, and
contexts where his or her health data is collected, processed,
stored, and disclosed.
Furthermore, systems and stakeholders have the responsibility
to publish information needed for trust verification and support
openness and transparency of data processing.
Ubiquitous health features and its ubiquitous environment
suggest that trustworthiness and privacy are real concerns [9,10].
In ubiquitous health, it is difficult to understand the processing
of data inside the systems [11], as systems do not always
perform in accordance with their policies, and the privacy
preferences of DS might conflict with the business objectives
of the system [12]. As a result, the DS cannot assume that the
existing legal framework guarantees the processing of PHI
lawfully and according to the rules proposed by him or her
[13,14]. In addition, DS also cannot assume that systems have
implemented security rules and functional privacy requirements
derived from laws and standards [1,15]. A big challenge in
ubiquitous health is that different stakeholders (eg, systems,
customers, third parties, and regulators) can have their own
privacy policies.
Here we hypothesize that in order to be successful, ubiquitous
health requires trustworthiness and privacy management made
by the DS. Without these two features, DS will not dare to use
its services. Furthermore, the architecture supporting ubiquitous
health should fulfill the THEWS principles presented above.
As traditional security and trust mechanisms used in today’s
health care information systems may not provide adequate
security and privacy in ubiquitous health [1,2,16], a novel
architecture is required.
Prior Work
The development of ubiquitous systems and the growing use
of ubiquitous computing have raised the following question:
What kind of trust and privacy models, services, and
architectures offers acceptable level of privacy and
trustworthiness?
Trust Models
Trust models such as belief, organizational trust, dispositional
trust, recommended trust, and direct trust have been proposed
for pervasive systems [8,17,18]. Dispositional trust describes
the general trusting attitude of the trustor [17]. Direct trust is
derived from the outcomes of interactions with peers [19]. In
recommended trust, an agent makes a recommendation based
on the beliefs that other entity is trustworthy at certain degree.
Organizational or institution-based trust is based on the
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perceived properties of, or the reliance placed on, a system or
institution [7]. Reputation is a recommended rating based on
the opinions of others [8]. All of them are situational, that is,
the amount of trust that a DS experiences depends dynamically
on situation and service-specific trust features [20,21].
A trust is typically based on the trustor’s characteristics such
as ability, integrity, and benevolence and should not be a blind
guess [5]. It is expressed either by value, rating, or ranking or
as probability or belief [22]. Trust attributes such as integrity,
motivation, competence, and predictability are proposed to
measure the confidence level [23]. Attributes proposed by
Hussin include trustee’s identifier, certificate, ability,
predictability, trustee’s privacy policy, legal requirements, and
system’s properties such as transparency, authenticity,
confidentiality, and nonrepudiation [24]. Researchers have
developed mathematical methods such as Bayesian probability,
Beta probability, maximum likelihood, game theory, weighted
arithmetic means, and average of weighted recommendations
to measure the degree of belief or recommended trust [25-27].
Trust degree can also be measured from interaction frequencies
between trustor and trustee [28], or from context-dependent
direct and indirect recommendations collected from selected
users [19].
In contrast to belief and recommended trust, computational trust
built on abstractions of human concept of trust has been
proposed by researchers [25,29]. Within ubiquitous computing,
computational trust means automation of decisions in the
presence of unknown, uncontrollable, and possibly harmful
agents [29]. Computational trust value has been calculated using
trustor’s experience, recommendations, interactions, knowledge,
measurements, distance, and density of events [13,25,28,30,31].
Service level agreements, contractual agreements, reputation
based on the brand’s name, trust manifesto, trust negotiation,
exchanging and evaluating credentials, and recommendations
made by a trust authority (TA) are also widely used in
commercial eServices [32,33].
The aforementioned trust models have noticeable weaknesses
in ubiquitous environment. Recommendations are unreliable
because they are based on unsecure opinions. It is difficult to
force everyone to accept certificates or common TA, and many
virtual organizations do not have connection to it. A common
ontology that is required for successful negotiation and
calculation of trust attributes seldom exists. Trust manifesto
assumes that the DS blindly trusts that service providers will
deliver their promises. Furthermore, the reliability of reputations
is difficult to measure, and credentials are difficult to evaluate
[25].
Privacy Models and Formula
Many privacy models developed by researchers are useful in
ubiquitous environment. Lederer et al proposed a model of
situational faces [34]. The model proposed by Hong et al uses
control and feedback [10]. The model suggested by Friedwald
et al included actors, environment, activity, information flow,
control level, and enabling technology [35]. Adams and Sasse
look at privacy as preferences and constraints, and use a
computer-understandable language for expressing them [36].
Jiang and Landay used an information space model [37], and
Kapadia et al applied virtual walls for privacy management
[38]. Diaz et al proposed entropy as measure of privacy level
[39].
Privacy management model proposed by Lederer et al combined
Adams’s perceptual model and Lessing’s societal privacy
models [40,41]. In the model by Lederer et al, a preferred
privacy level depends on legislation, market features, norms,
technology used, nature of personal information disclosed,
contextual features, information sensitivity, characteristics of
information user, and expected cost-benefit ratio. A limitation
of this model is that its variables are qualitative and abstract.
Trust and Privacy Technologies and Solutions
Numerous trust and privacy technologies have been proposed
for ubiquitous systems. In Gray’s solution, the trust is based on
the belief of a person that systems have implemented proper
de-identification structures and safeguards. It also includes a
compliance checker and a trust value calculator [42].
PoliCyMaker, KeyNote, Simple Public Key Infrastructure, and
Pretty Good Privacy solutions use credentials [43]. The Trust-X
approach by Bertino et al uses digital credentials, which are
iteratively disclosed and verified [32]. Becerra et al proposed
intelligent agents to evaluate which other agents can be trusted
[23]. According to the Skopik’s approach, rule-based trust
interpretation takes into account the subjective nature of trust
[44]. Joshi et al noted that it is possible to make security and
privacy decisions based on trust attributes [45].
Computational trust is either based on direct measurements,
observed (monitored) features, or past experiences [46]. In
ubiquitous environment, successful monitoring requires common
ontology and measurable indicators [22]. The trust manager
architecture proposed by Salah et al collects trust aspects for
calculator that computes a trust score. The architecture also
includes recommendation manager, monitor services, context
provider, log service, and policy manager [47]. In the EnCoRe
architecture, the TA keeps track of promises, manages
decryption keys, discloses them, and verifies systems properties
[48]. Thereby, the customer should trust on the system’s released
willingness to fulfill the personal policies of DS.
Privacy is often protected by using privacy enhancement
solutions such as data filtering and minimization, anonymization,
and adding noise to disclosed information (eg, data hashing,
cloaking, blurring, and identity hiding) [41,49]. In metadata
approaches, privacy policies can be injected to application,
tagged to the metadata, or added to the database or an active
agent [50]. Berghe and Schunter’s “privacy injector” adds
privacy rules to existing applications [11]. The EnCoRe
architecture uses the sticky policy paradigm where the DS can
stick machine-readable rules to the data before it is disclosed
[48]. Metadata can include embedded (active) code that enables
self-destruction (apoptosis) in the case the environment is not
trusted [51]. Apoptosis can also be context- or situation-aware
(ie, programmed death) [52]. As per Pallapa et al, active privacy
metadata dynamically controls the transparency of data in a
context [53].
Other solutions also exist for privacy protection. Kapadia et al
created a virtual personal space (a room) to control information
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flow through its “walls” [38]. In the PICOS platform from Kahl
et al, a privacy advisor helps the DS to create own policies [54].
In the United States, a flexible approach that uses privacy and
security labels is under development. In this standardized
solution, PHI is segmented and security and privacy labels are
bound to those segments [55].
In pervasive systems, privacy requirements are typically
expressed as policies that are context-dependent. Policies define
what is permitted or prohibited, and which are permitted actions
[45]. From the DS viewpoint, policy can be understood as a
statement (rules) about how a certain system should behave
[56]. Policies are typically published in the form of credentials
or metadata, and rules are expressed using policy language [33].
The successful use of policies requires policy matching,
mismatch notification, policy lifecycle management, risk
analysis, regulatory compliance checking, and possibility to
model privacy regulations [48,57]. It is also necessary that the
DS can enforce personal polices [58]. Policies should also be
checked for ontological compatibility [59].
The increasing use of the Internet, peer-to-peer systems,
multi-agent systems, and social networks has been main drivers
for discussed privacy and trust models and solutions.
Unfortunately, most of them are focused on one feature (eg,
encryption or context). Ubiquitous health requires much wider
approach. Like Bryce et al, we also state that pervasive systems
require an architecture that combines dynamic privacy policies,
a priori trust validation, privacy management, and a posteriori
measurement (ie, feedback) what systems are doing [2].
Regulatory compliance is also needed.
In this paper, we propose a novel privacy management
architecture for ubiquitous health. As ubiquitous health is a new
concept without widely accepted principles and privacy and
trust models, it is necessary to select on which principles and
models the architecture is based. THEWS principles, as
previously presented, have been selected by the authors on the
basis of the architecture, that is, the architecture should be
compliant with them. The solution should take into account
features of ubiquitous health and enable the DS to dynamically
manage the privacy by defining system-specific privacy policies.
The architecture should mimic the way humans use trust
information in creation of personal policies. The architecture
should also offer protection against many known privacy threats
existing in ubiquitous environment.
Methods
From system theory and systems engineering perspectives,
ubiquitous health is a metasystem that is characterized by its
structure, its function/behavior, and how its interrelated
components are composed in an ordered way. Instead of creating
artificial scenarios or making quantitative privacy risk/threat
analysis, a more system-oriented sequential method that
combines methodologies used in systems engineering,
requirement analysis, and system design is used (Figure 1).
The method used in this study includes the following steps:
definition of basic requirements; selection of values, privacy
and trust models, and views; identification of concerns;
definition of functional requirements; selection of services;
developing privacy and trust formula; and designing the
architecture. Finally, it is checked how the architecture meets
purposes and requirements for which it has been intended.
On the background of processing of health information stay
ethical values and codes, principles, and common rules.
Selection of these features has also strong impact on the
architecture and its services. For some environments (eg, health
care), widely accepted codes and rules already exist; however,
this is not the case in ubiquitous health. Therefore, the first step
is to select privacy and trust models and approaches that are in
line with principles and without noticeable weaknesses. This is
achieved by carefully analyzing existing research published in
journals, conference proceedings, and standards documents.
Similarly, identification of concerns and definition of functional
requirements are also done. Finally, the architecture combines
selected services in such a way that principles and requirements
are fulfilled.
In this paper, privacy and trust needs are examined from the
DS’s viewpoint. Other views are not discussed. To reduce the
complexity, only components that are relevant for the privacy
management needs of the DS are included in the architecture.
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Figure 1. Method for the development of the THEWS architecture.
Results
General Overview
Ruotsalainen et al have noted that privacy rules in ubiquitous
health are based on trust [1]. Therefore, privacy and trust models
selected should take into consideration features of ubiquitous
health, trust and privacy aspects of systems offering health
services, regulatory requirements, and the DS’s privacy needs.
The asymmetric relationship between systems providing health
services and the DS should also be considered (ie, the DS
seldom has the power to force a system to put personal rules
into effect). Furthermore, in practice, the DS has no tools to
make personal observations of systems’ internal security and
privacy features and policies [51,60].
Principles, Models, and Views
In spite that privacy is widely accepted as human right (value),
different privacy models do exist in real life. Regulatory and
self-regulatory models are widely used [15]. Privacy can also
be considered as personal property [20]. Regulatory model is
insufficient in ubiquitous environments [13], and self-regulation
made by business community gives systems as stronger partner
much freedom to set rules [15]. Because in ubiquitous health
the DS has the right to set personal rules to regulate and control
his or her health information, self-regulation model that uses
privacy as the DS’s personal property has been selected for the
architecture.
Suitability of widely used privacy protection and management
approaches in the context of ubiquitous health is shown in Table
1. Based on Table 1 and the fact that pervasive systems require
dynamic and context-aware privacy management [46], the
foremost privacy approach for ubiquitous health is privacy
management that uses context- and content-aware policies and
supports transparency and regulatory compliance.
Trustworthy ubiquitous health requires that used trust model
enables the DS to work out the level of trustworthiness of
systems. Characteristics and weaknesses of widely used trust
models in regard to features of ubiquitous health are shown in
Table 2. As a result, trust in ubiquitous health cannot be based
on the belief or reputation, and the DS usually does not have a
right to verify recommended trust. Credentials typically assume
that Hobson choice and privacy labels have inappropriate
granularity. Although some researchers assume that the
protection power of laws is sufficient and certification offers
acceptable level of trust [12], the regulations and certificates
are found to be insufficient in ubiquitous health.
Computational trust that is based on systems’ measurable or
observed properties can offer reasonable information to the DS
in designing personal privacy policies [25]. The limitation that
the information content of a single trust value is too low for
policy formulation [61] can be overcome by using additional
system-specific attributes. Therefore, computational
organizational trust with attributes is selected as the trust model
for ubiquitous health.
From the DS viewpoint, the architecture should mimic humans’
ways to design policies, support more rational choices than
intuition, and give feedback to the DS. Louviere’s stated
customer choice method fulfills these requirements by including
awareness, learning, evaluation and comparison, preference
formulation, and choice and post-choice [62]; hence, it is
selected for the method that the DS uses in the formulation of
privacy policies.
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Table 1. Suitability of common privacy protection and management approaches for ubiquitous health.
SuitabilityApproach
Security cannot offer reasonable level of privacy in ubiquitous health. Access
control alone is insufficient. The DS is not familiar and cannot control authoriza-
tion rules used inside a system
Privacy protection using security services (eg, authentication, autho-
rization, and access control)
Health care and health services require the knowledge of the DS’s identityPrivacy control by hiding the DS’s identity
Delegation requires knowledge to whom the DS delegates access rights. Systems
specifically do not publish this kind of information to the DS
Delegation approach
Rules deployed in a label might be inadequate and in conflict with the DS policy
that may or could not be specified in labels
Privacy labels
Supports dynamic policies, but requires computer-understandable policy lan-
guage. Common ontology, ontology harmonization (matching, mapping, etc.),
or reasoning is needed
Privacy management using context- and content-aware policies
All systems do not accept injected or active codeMetadata approach
Health services require large amount of PHI for correct and effective services,
as incomplete PHI can lead to wrong decisions or prevent the use of services
Data filtering and adding noise to data
Table 2. Characteristics and weaknesses of common trust models.
Characteristics and weaknesses in ubiquitous healthModel
Characteristics: Based on belief, attitude, or others’ opinions (recommendations)Dispositional trust and recom-
mended trust
Weakness: Recommendations are unreliable and based on unsecure opinions. It is difficult or even impossible to
check the reliability of others’ recommendations
Characteristics: Based on belief or attitude that organization has implemented sufficient safeguardsBlind trust
Weakness: Does not guarantee trustworthiness
Characteristics: Based on assumption that an organization has implemented required regulatory servicesPredefined trust
Weakness: Static model. Unsuitable for dynamic environments.
Characteristics: Based on organizational or personal labelsTrust label
Weakness: Inappropriate granularity and insufficient consideration of dynamic contextual conditions
Characteristics: Based on assurance of service providerTrust manifesto
Weakness: Based on belief or attitude. The DS should blindly trust
Characteristics: Based on subjective opinions of othersReputation
Weakness: The reliability of reputations is difficult to measure
Characteristics: Based on system’s measured or observed featuresComputational trust
Weakness: A simple trust value or rank might offer insufficient information for the DS in designing personal policies
Characteristics: Based on risk or threat assessmentRisk- and threat-based models
Weakness: Difficult or even impossible to measure personal privacy risks
Characteristics: Based on credentials issued by authorities. It is targeted to create trust between organizationsTrust management using creden-
tials
Weakness: Credentials are static. Difficult to evaluate and require a network of trusted authorities. It is difficult to
force everyone and virtual systems to accept credentials or a TA
Identification of Concerns
Typical stakeholders in ubiquitous health are the DS, health
service providers, other organizations, and secondary users.
Different stakeholders have different concerns [1]. This paper
is focused to the DS concerns. The main concerns of the DS are
as follows: (1) how trustworthy the system is, (2) why is lack
of awareness and transparency in data collection and processing,
(3) who is using the data inside a system, (4) how to guarantee
that data is processed lawfully, and (5) according to the DS’s
policies, how to prevent post-release of data and control
unnecessary secondary use.
Functional Requirements
Derived from previously mentioned assumptions and selections
and the proposals made by other researchers, the architecture
should identify the following functional requirements. The
architecture should offer tools for the DS to define purposes of
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data collection, express computer-understandable rules regarding
the sensitivity of data elements, design protection needed, rule
how long data is stored, and which data is disclosed and for
what purposes [14,48].
The architecture should support dynamic content-, context-,
and purpose-aware privacy management. It should also offer to
the DS system-specific computational trust information with
attributes that describe systems’ features, infrastructures,
policies, and relations in advance. Humans’ way to design
policies, to support more rational choices than intuition, and to
give feedback should need to be mimicked. The architecture
must be compliance with Louviere’s stated customer choice
method. It should support situations where the DS discloses
PHI and where data collection or disclosure is made
autonomously by a system. The architecture also enables the
DS to be aware of data-processing events, and to set policies
regulate the secondary use and reuse of PHI.
Trust and Privacy Services
Services of the architecture should fulfill above-mentioned
requirements, and take into account expected concerns. Trust
and privacy services selected for the THEWS architecture are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Trusts and privacy services for the THEWS architecture.
ServiceConcern/Function
Trust calculation serviceSystem’s trustworthiness
Context service
Identification service
Trust interpreter service
Decision support serviceThe DS’s information autonomy
Policy-binding service
Monitoring, trust calculation, and notification servicesAwareness and transparency
Monitoring and notification servicesThe use of PHI inside the system
Monitoring and notification servicesDoes the system use PHI according to the DS’s policies
Policy-binding serviceChoice and secondary use and post-release of PHI
Metadata (eg, sticky policy or active code for apoptosis)
Decision support serviceDesigning privacy policies and comparison and preference formulation
Policy management servicePolicy formulation and post-choice and new policy creation
Policy assistant service
Ontology service
Trust calculation serviceSystem’s features and relations
Monitoring serviceFeedback and alarm or conflict notice
Trust interpreter and policy assistance servicesLearning
Privacy and Trust Formula
The THEWS principles and functional requirements determine
that the DS can use trust information in the formulation of
privacy policies [1]. The following formula has been developed
to illustrate how trust information, privacy variables, and privacy
policy are related:
Privacy_policy=f(TI, IS, SE, PU)
In this formula, TI refers to trust_information offered by the
architecture to the DS. IS, SE, and PU are privacy variables
proposed by Lederer [40]. IS refers to the sensitivity of the data,
SE describes the situation where information is used, and PU
defines the purpose of data collection or use.
To avoid the drawback of a single calculated trust value and to
enable attribute-based creation of personal policies [61], the
following trust information formula was developed:
Trust_information=Trust_value+Trust_feature_vector
Trust_feature_vector gives the system- and environment-specific
information to the DS about systems’ regulatory compliance
and their willingness to follow the DS’s policies and support
openness. Slightly modified trust attributes originally proposed
by Hussin et al have been selected for trust value calculation
[24]:
Trust_value=(E, T, P, PO, Pre, Tran, Ab)
where E represents domain specific environmental factors such
as legal requirements and system’s contextual features. T
represents the type of service provider’s organization (eg, public
health care provider, private health service provider, Internet
service provider). P (properties) consists of systems architectural
and technological aspects and PO is system’s privacy policy.
Predictability (Pre), transparency (Tran), and ability (Ab) are
different parameters that can be calculated from the system’s
past history or by direct measurements. For
Trust_feature_vector, the following formula was developed:
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Trust_feature_vector=(DGD, DRB, SPO, DSP, ASP, CD, ATV,
AUT, RP, PBL, DSA)
where DGD and DRB describe the level of system’s regulatory
compliance. The DGD is the degree of data processing made
by the system in compliance with international privacy
protection directives. The DRB is the degree of data processing
performed by the system compliant with health care-specific
laws and rules. SPO and RP are parameters that are related to
openness. SPO informs if the system has made its privacy
policies openly available, and RP tells the status if the system
has published its relationships. DSP, ASP, ATV, and AUT are
willingness parameters. DSP describes the degree by which the
system follows its own privacy policies. ASP informs that the
system either enables or rejects the DS to inject personal policies
to PHI collected or processed by the system. The ATV expresses
whether the system accepts external monitoring of events related
to the processing of PHI, and AUT tells whether the system
enables external access to its audit trails. The PBL and CD are
trustworthiness parameters. CD informs whether the system has
been certified, and PBL informs about the position of the system
on the blacklist. The DSA is an optional attribute that can be
defined by the DS. For DGD and DRB, a linear scale (0...1) is
used, whereas all others attributes have only binary values. In
case of no or insufficient data, the attribute value is zero.
Using proposed Trust_information, the DS can predict system’s
willingness or ability to process PHI legally and follow rules
set by the DS. The Trust_information informs the DS about
how much it can trust on a system, how system’s policy and
technical architecture look like, and to what extent system’s
policy is compliant with domain-specific regulations and laws.
If needed, the DS can use attributes to mark a system untrusted
(eg, in the case it will not publish its policies nor would accept
monitoring). Most attributes can be calculated from information
the system has, or should have, published; however, some
attributes might require direct observations. Attributes such as
DSP can be calculated from the system’s past history.
The THEWS Architecture
A layered framework model that describes trust and privacy
services of the THEWS architecture is shown in Figure 2. The
top layer of the model consists of common services that are
offered to all stakeholders. The middle layer includes privacy
and trust services needed. Ubiquitous health, stakeholders, other
users, and PHI are located in the lowest layer (ie, network layer).
As it is difficult or even impossible for the DS to evaluate the
trustworthiness of systems, an independent agent, the trust
calculator (TC), is used for this task. The role of TC is not to
make trust decisions. Similar to HL7 Privacy, Access and
Security Services architecture, the TC should be understood as
an information point that sends trust information to the DS [55].
The TC calculates Trust_information (ie, Trust_value and related
Trust_feature_vector) by using the information that system has
published, and available contextual data, system’s measured or
monitored features, and system’s past history. It also detects
malicious or fake systems by using information obtained from
context and monitoring services. Two assistance services are
offered to the DS: (1) trust interpreter and (2) policy assistance
service. The DS can use the trust interpretation to understand
the meaning of received Trust_information.
The context service collects systems’contextual data, interprets
it, and makes it available to TC and DS, using ontologies. The
DS deploys policy management, policy-binding, policy
assistance, and decision support services in policy formulation.
The monitoring service offers feedback, reduces risk, and
recognizes policy conflicts. It records and assesses how a system
in real life processes PHI. It recognizes policy conflicts and
alarms the TC and the DS of possible malicious or illegal use
of PHI. The notification service works as communication and
transparency tool between the DS, systems and services. Using
this service, the DS expresses personal policies to systems that
in turn publish their policies and relations.
An architectural model describing the interconnection of the
THEWS services is shown in Figure 3. In the architecture, the
policy formulation is a decision-making process, where the DS
chooses privacy rules, privacy management services, and the
amount of PHI he or she wants to trade in according to expected
service benefits. The selected rules and services depend on
privacy needs, Trust_information, and the purpose of data
request. Typical privacy management services that can be
activated before data disclosure are encryption, anonymization,
and data filtering. The DS may also inject policies and/or active
code to the metadata.
The THEWS architecture not only fulfils the THEWS
requirements but also offers protection against many of the
known privacy threats existing in pervasive systems as shown
in Table 4.
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Figure 2. The framework model for the THEWS architecture.
Figure 3. The interconnection of privacy and trust services in the THEWS architecture.
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Table 4. The THEWS architecture approach for the challenges existing in pervasive systems.
THEWS approachChallenges and threats
Dynamic rules and services are usedPervasive systems are dynamic in nature (eg, ad hoc networks) where static
rules and privacy services will not work
Dynamic creation and management of the DS’s privacy service portfolio
Dynamic trust calculation based on systems’ measured propertiesNo predefined trust
Dynamic context-aware polices support ad hoc purposesThe need of PII is dynamic and purposes are unpredictable
The way systems process PHI is dynamically monitored, and the regu-
latory compliance is checked
Organizations do not always follow their own policies, and laws will be inef-
fective without sufficient control and penalties
The DS define system-specific policies that rule the use, storing, and
sharing of PHI
Users want to control how systems use PII
Status and policies are inspected and informed dynamically to the DSIt is difficult to know what is the actual privacy status of an enterprise (ie,
what data and under what policy)
The monitoring service can check internal useIt is difficult to know how data has been used inside the enterprise
Systems must publish their relationsRelationships between systems can be unknown
Trustworthiness is not based on certificatesAll service providers do not use certificates
The TC offers calculated trust value and trust attributes to the DSSelection of service provider needs trust and/or reputation
Reputation is not used
The TC calculates trust using direct measurementsDetermining of systems’ trustworthiness is challenging
The monitoring service gives feedback to the TC
The TC and/or monitoring service inform the DS of privacy breachesWhich action the DS must take in the case of privacy breach?
The DS can change policy dynamically
Trust attributes offer required informationHow to guarantee that data is processed lawfully and according to the DS’s
policies
The monitoring service notifies misuse
Systems must publish their rules and relationshipsLack of awareness
Awareness by monitoring service
The DS defines personal context-aware rulesHow to know what actions are permitted or forbidden in a context and what
actions must be performed?
Privacy notice/manifesto is not usedHow we can trust on systems privacy notices (or privacy manifesto)?
Communication platform and systems must implement reasonable
safeguards
Threats caused by surveillance, identity theft, or malicious attacks
Those models are not usedCode of conduct, legal framework, and accreditation of centers will not
guarantee trustworthiness
Consent is only one possible item in the policyConsent does not guarantee adequate protection
Anonymization is only a value-added serviceAnonymization such as “we know” will not guarantee adequate protection
Monitoring serviceSecondary use of PII must be monitored
The monitoring service assesses the audit log and informs findings to
the DS
Citizens need audit information
The TC can maintain a list of untrusted or malicious systems
The TC defines the used trust ontologyData requestors can have subjective views of trust
Credentials are not usedHow can we manage trust for systems with incomplete credentials?
Discussion
In this study, novel privacy architecture is developed for
ubiquitous health. It enables the DS to ensure and manage
information privacy by choosing personal context-aware privacy
policies for each system with the help of computational trust
information that includes a trust value and system-specific trust
attributes. The architecture combines many trust and privacy
services proposed by researchers for pervasive systems such as
trust calculation and interpretation, policy management, policy
assistance, policy binding and design, and context services and
monitoring. The architecture goes far beyond the security
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services with traditional access control used in health care, and
it also illustrates how the THEWS principles can be realized.
Furthermore, the architecture offers protections against many
privacy threats caused by ubiquitous computing and unsecure
environment. Instead of continuous validation of systems’
trustworthiness, the architecture monitors functioning of the
systems, detects and informs the DS of policy conflicts and data
misuse, and thereby enables the DS to dynamically change
policies.
Contrary to a widely used trust manifesto that is based on
incomplete, insufficient, or inconclusive information [33] or a
single trust value that offers only Hobson’s choice to the DS,
the architecture gives information to the DS that indicates the
level of transparency and openness of a system, how system
follows health-specific privacy rules and regulations, and how
mature the system is to accept the DS’s policies. Using this
information and policy assistance, decision support, and
policy-binding services of the architecture, the DS can construct
context- and content-dependent policy profiles and assign them
to systems. The architecture is user-friendly, and there is no
need to interactively calculate the trust value against the DS’s
dynamic privacy needs.
For all pervasive systems, some of the unsolved privacy
challenges are as follows: (1) How to prevent data from being
collected and used in a way that DS cannot recognize? (2) How
to prevent systems for breaching their promises? and (3) How
to prevent the misuse of PHI after it has been released for
secondary use?
Regulation and monitoring can give partial solution to first two
challenges. Policy agents, self-destroying files, programmed
death (apoptosis), destruction of cryptographic keys, and
mutation engines have been proposed by researchers to give
protection in the case of post-release [52,63]. The flexibility of
developed architecture enables the DS to deploy any of these
engines to control the secondary use of PHI.
In addition, there remain some more important challenges. The
TC should understand both international and national
regulations, and rules used by systems. Translation of narrative
rules into machine-readable policies is an ongoing challenge
[14]. The use of computer-understandable and context-aware
polices requires either that all stakeholders accept a common
policy language (such as Ponder, KAoS, Security Assertion
Markup Language, eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language, Rei, XPath-Based Preference Language, P3P, and
APPEL) or that they use a method that enables semantically
correct transformation between languages, based on ontologies
[43,64,65]. Meta-policies such as P3P and Rei are candidates
for the latter case [64,66,67]. In ubiquitous health, the use of a
single policy language and a common ontology might be
impossible. A possible solution is that the TC and the DS simply
inform to systems about the ontology and policy language they
use. If this is not possible, a service that maintains
interoperability between policy languages and offers ontology
reasoning should be developed [68]. In addition to policy,
context and trust ontologies and other ontologies such as
information and communication technology ontologies that
describe systems’ architectural and organizational aspects and
mechanisms are needed. Considering the future work, the
authors will evaluate the architecture, and validate its feasibility
and functionality in pilot setting. As a minimum, the proof of
concept will be done. The authors will also demonstrate that
the proposed solution is technically valid, safe to use, and
efficient.
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